A stronger China

The latest China Brief from the Jamestown Foundation has two articles well worth the read.

First, China's relations with Pakistan are an area of particular focus for China. For Pakistan, China makes a natural ally against the improving relations between the US and India, especially as the US and India work to conclude a deal on India's nuclear industry. Pakistan would like similar assistance from the US, but such help is unlikely to come. Therefore, China stands ready to partner with Pakistan.

And for China, Pakistan could provide a route to Iranian oil.

Besides, China and Pakistan are engaged in building key strategic infrastructures to further strengthen their defense ties. The construction of the Karakorum Highway (KKH)—which connects western China and its largest autonomous region of Xinjiang with Pakistan’s Northern Areas (NAs) all the way through Islamabad—was the first such major project. Since its completion in the 1970s, the Karakorum Highway has been used for limited trade and travel, however. In harsh winters, the stretch running through the Northern Areas and Xinjiang becomes unusable for motorized traffic due to heavy snowfall. Chinese and Pakistani engineers have since been trying to render it into an all-weather passageway. Yet limited trade and travel remained a poor incentive for such an expensive undertaking, until its renewed strategic significance became all too apparent in recent days. In a strict strategic sense, KKH is considered priceless. It gives Beijing unhindered access to Jammu and Kashmir in India, in addition to enabling it to the India’s movement along Aksai Chin, which China seized from India in 1962, severing India’s land-link to China’s turbulent autonomous regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. For Pakistan, the KKH is an added security for its turbulent Northern Areas, all the way up to Siachin where Indian and Pakistani troops have been in a stand-off since the mid-1980s.

On February 20, China and Pakistan agreed to widen KKH for larger vehicles with heavier freight. The rebuilding of KKH will enable China to ship its energy supplies from the Middle East from Gwader Port in Baluchistan through the land route of KKH to western China, which is its development hub. This alternative energy supply route will reduce Beijing’s dependence on the Malacca Straits. General Musharraf also wants to set up a “crude transit route” through Gwader Port for Beijing’s energy shipments from Iran and Africa. For this reason, Pakistan is building oil refineries, natural gas terminals, oil and gas equipment, and transit facilities in Baluchistan. China has agreed to help Pakistan with its plans for the development of its oil and gas industry. With this planned elaborate energy infrastructure, KKH has assumed an added significance as an alternative land link between China and its energy sources, of which Iran sits atop.

Beijing and Tehran are now all set to sign a $100 billion agreement on developing Iran’s Yadavaran oil field in southern Iran as early as March this year (Reuters, February 17). Under this agreement, China will buy 10 million tons of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from Iran each year over the next 25 years. KKH would be the shortest and safest land route to ship Iranian LNG to western China. In return for LNG, China will develop the Yadavaran oil field, which is estimated to have three billion barrels of oil and is expected to produce about 300,000 barrels of oil per day, which is equivalent to China’s current imports from Iran (Ibid.). General Musharraf wants to turn Pakistan into China’s “energy corridor” for Chinese energy imports from the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Africa (Daily Times, February 18). He also wants Pakistan to be China’s “trade corridor” for its exports to Central Asia. For the latter reason, Pakistan has recently built the Torkham-Jalalabad road in northwestern Pakistan (i.e., Pakhtunkhaw province) and Chaman-Kandahar railroad link in Baluchistan to carry Chinese manufactured goods to Central Asia through Afghanistan.

As mentioned in the above quote, China does not want to become dependent on the Malacca Straits. One reason for this is the US Navy, the supreme ruler of the high seas. The US Navy could jeopardize traffic through the Straits in a crisis, and China does not want to give the US a potential chokehold on supplies of oil to China through the Straits.

Therefore, as the second article points out, China has been making pointed efforts to improve its navy to the point where it might give the US a run for its money.

Under the country’s first ocean-going naval strategy promoted by Admiral Liu Huaqing, the navy has since the late 1980s extended its combat mission from coastal defense to offshore power projection, with corresponding alterations in operational objectives, weapons R & D and battle tactics. Yet the quickest progress has been made since 2000. A new pattern of naval transformation seems to be in the making with profound regional impact.
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Such phenomenal growth both in quantity and in quality is unprecedented in PLAN history. Analysts still debate whether this change represents a normal trial/production cycle or a new era of a sharp rise for the PLAN. Whatever the answer to the debate, the stagnation of the 1990s is over. That decade witnessed PLA technological accumulation, which helps to kick off a big jump now.
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China’s naval modernization is not for show of force to China’s neighbors. Every class of warships—whether a submarine or a surface combatant—has clear tactical function in an envisaged sea battle. In the short- to medium-future, the combat situation for these ships are set in the country’s maritime territories, most likely in the Taiwan Strait. To be more concrete, the extensive waters to the east of Taiwan are designated as the major battle ground in which the naval vessels cannot expect effective air force support. The aircraft carrier project is largely for this purpose [6]. Before the PLAN possesses any aircraft carriers, fleet air defense becomes essential for naval operations of some duration. This is one of the reasons why the PLA has identified air warfare destroyers as the top priority for weapons development, resulting in the production of 170 and 171.
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The question of whether the Chinese navy is a capable one is gauged by the technologies it possesses, not by maritime strategy, such as Admiral Liu’s. Yet the continued addition of new capabilities will fill the gap between strategy and combat effectiveness. The PLAN is firmly committed to move in the direction of achieving partial superiority in a specific war situation relatively close to home waters.

The articles also refer to China's quest for advanced technology. China has been on a buying binge for some years now. You might recall that China's acquisition of technology was an issue during the Clinton Administration.

This Heritage Foundation article from 1997 is a good synopsis of the dangers perceived back then, and how the Clinton Administration did not make it a priority to keep technology that could become a threat to us out of Chinese hands.

Several friends and allies of the United States, including Russia and Israel, are selling such advanced weaponry and military technology to China, and several European countries, among them France and Britain, also are interested in tapping this market. This is a dangerous strategic development. For example, China could use increased military technology and hardware to build survivable intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with which to target the United States. It could build new long-range cruise missiles and, possibly, a power-projection air force. And it could increase its naval capabilities with new submarines and supersonic anti-ship missiles. With such capability, the PLA would pose a realistic threat to U.S. forces and to allies like the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Or it could sell this technology to rogue states which are less interested in diplomacy. Indeed, China's drive to become a great military power is one of the most important challenges facing the United States in Asia.
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Nevertheless, China continues to make substantial efforts to modernize its military, including efforts to obtain and utilize foreign military technology to increase the capabilities and reach of the People's Liberation Army. For America's friends to contribute to this buildup should be unacceptable to both the defense and policy communities in Washington, especially in view of China's potentially hostile intentions toward Taiwan and in the South China Sea. The Clinton Administration, however, has made only modest and ineffective attempts to convince U.S. allies and friends involved in facilitating China's military modernization that they should halt this dangerous weapons-related traffic.
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So far, the Clinton Administration has preferred to downplay this issue or to confine it to private diplomacy.15 This past spring, when the House of Representatives voted three times to reduce U.S. economic aid to Russia if Moscow sold SS-N-22 supersonic cruise missiles to China, the Administration helped to defeat the legislation. In addition to demonstrating a lack of leadership by the Administration, this stand did not help to defend U.S. interests or U.S. military personnel in Asia.

China is not acting out of the same aggressiveness that now drives Iran. It is doing what ambitious nations do. However, we would do well to remember that China is a rival, and wants to diminish our influence in East Asia. China is not a friend of freedom and democracy, and could be pushed to irrational actions over Taiwan. What is now a rivalry could become something more dangerous, and with China growing in power, a confrontation could have serious consequences.