An enemy divided

Today the New York Times has one of those articles where you wonder how it got by their editors. There is not a single accusation that President Bush drowns kittens for fun in a White House bathtub.

The article addresses the growing conflict between Al Qaeda and Iraqi Sunni insurgents in Iraq.

American and Iraqi officials believe that the conflicts present them with one of the biggest opportunities since the insurgency burst upon Iraq nearly three years ago. They have begun talking with local insurgents, hoping to enlist them to cooperate against Al Qaeda, said Western diplomats, Iraqi officials and an insurgent leader.

It is impossible to say just how far the split extends within the insurgency, which remains a lethal force with a shared goal of driving the Americans out of Iraq. Indeed, the best the Americans can hope for may be a grudging passivity from the Iraqi insurgents when the Americans zero in on Al Qaeda's forces.

But the split within the insurgency is coinciding with Sunni Arabs' new desire to participate in Iraq's political process, and a growing resentment of the militants. Iraqis are increasingly saying that they regard Al Qaeda as a foreign-led force, whose extreme religious goals and desires for sectarian war against Iraq's Shiite majority override Iraqi tribal and nationalist traditions.

It is one of Al Qaeda's serious missteps in Iraq, their continued attacks on civilians.

"The tribes are fed up with Al Qaeda and they will not tolerate any more," said a senior Iraqi intelligence official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. The intelligence official confirmed reports that a Sunni tribe in Samarra had tried and executed Qaeda members for their role in assassinating a local sheik.

On Tuesday the White House released a document entitled Progress and the Work Ahead in Iraq. This document is essentially a synopsis of goals in the National Strategy, which I mentioned here.

This document touches on why there is growing conflict between the bloody killers in Al Qaeda and the Sunni insurgents.

Iraqis Have Shown They Can Come Together For The Sake Of National Unity. After the January 2005 elections, Shia and Kurdish leaders who did well at the polls reached out to Sunni Arabs who failed to participate. Now Iraqis must reach out once again across political, religious, and sectarian lines and form a government of national unity. In the December 2005 elections, Sunnis turned out in large numbers. Sunnis who abandoned violence to join the political process must learn to use their influence to benefit their community and the country at large. Shia and Kurds need to understand that successful free societies protect minority rights. The success of Iraqi democracy will come when political divisions are driven not by sectarian rivalries but by ideas, convictions, and a common vision for the future.

The Sunnis themselves are coming to see that their best hope is to participate in the political process. Al Qaeda will be ever more marginalized, as they try to convince Sunnis that democracy, Iraqi style, is not in their best interest.

In 2006, The Coalition Will Focus Efforts On Improving The Performance Of Iraqi Police. Iraqi Army and police are increasingly able to take the lead in the fight, yet the Iraqi police still lag behind the Army in training and capabilities. One of the major goals in 2006 is to accelerate Iraqi police training and improve the performance of the Ministry of Interior's Special Police, the border police, and the local station police.

Another important element. The terrorists and insurgents will increasingly find themselves fighting Iraqis. This, too, will only marginalize the terrorist elements. How can they claim to be fighting for Iraqi's interests if they are fighting other Iraqis, the very security forces responsible for protecting Iraqis?