Iran’s Political/Nuclear Ambitions and U.S. Policy Options Pt. 2

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Iran’s Political/Nuclear Ambitions and U.S. Policy Options continued Thursday. Witnesses on the second day included Frank Wisner of the American International Group, Vali Nasr of the Naval Postgraduate School, Julia Nanay of PFC Energy, and James Phillips of the Heritage Foundation.

Again, here are some excerpts of the written statements.

Senator Lugar's Opening Statement

The witnesses generally shared the view that no diplomatic options, including direct talks, should be taken off the table. Direct talks may in some circumstances be useful in demonstrating to our allies our commitment to diplomacy, dispelling anti-American rumors among the Iranian people, preventing Iranian misinterpretation of our goals, or reducing the risk of accidental escalation. Our policies and our communications must be clear, precise, and confident, without becoming inflexible.

I noted a comment by Dr. Henry Kissinger in an op-ed on Iran that appeared in Tuesday’s Washington Post. Dr. Kissinger wrote: “The diplomacy appropriate to denuclearization is comparable to the containment policy that helped win the Cold War: i.e., no preemptive challenge to the external security of the adversary, but firm resistance to attempts to project its power abroad and reliance on domestic forces to bring about internal change. It was precisely such a nuanced policy that caused President Ronald Reagan to invite Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to a dialogue within weeks of labeling the Soviet Union the ‘evil empire.’”

Frank Wisner

The political consequences of an American attack would be even more devastating. I can assure you that there will be an eruption of protest across the Muslim world; public opinion in allied nations would be hostile and our standing in international fora would be undermined. We must also calculate the economic consequences. I have no way to predict where the price of oil will go in the wake of military action against Iran or counter moves which impded the Straits of Hormuz.
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The time is right, moreover, to signal that the United States not only seeks agreement which will contain the nuclear crisis but that we are prepared to cosider normalizing relations, provided, of course, that Iran is similarly disposed and acts accordingly. Engagement, through diplomatic dialogue, means addressing the broad array of issues that divide Iran from us and the international community – the issues that leave her marginalized and insecure - - in other words, the issues that undergird distrust of Iran.

Vali Nasr

Since 2005 elections Iran’s pro- democracy forces are demoralized and marginalized. They have lost their access to power and are excluded from all state institutions. They are disorganized. They lack political parties, and in?fighting has prevented them from forming a united front before the regime. They do not have a program of action or a platform that could challenge the current government’s foreign policy or populist ecnomic policies. In addition there is no wedge issue around which they could mobilize their followers, organize demonstrations, and build a movement. There is no major election on the calendar for the next five years—nothing to rally around. Escalation of tensions between U.S. and Iran—and especially the prospects of sanctions and a military strike on Iran—has moreover, created a rally to the flag henomenon in Iran—war and nationalist fervor do not favor democracy. As strong as the demand for democracy is in Iran the democracy movement is weak. It poses no palpable threats to regime stability.

Julia Nanay

About 60 percent of Iran’s export earnings come from the oil and gas sector and 40 to 50 percent of the government’s revenues. Investments in Iran’s oil and gas sector are already dramatically reduced and timetables delayed due to the sanctions currently in place, as well as weak terms on offer under the buyback contract model. Short of disrupting Iran’s oil trade with sanctions on oil exports, which would drive up oil prices and negatively impact the US economy, there is limited impact to be gained for the world community from any other additional sanctions on Iran’s oil and gas industry. In a market where companies and countries seek to secure their economic lifelines through access to oil and gas, the idea that you can create a fool-proof sanctions system targeted at any oil and gas producer is a non-starter. There will always be those who violate the sanctions.

Sanctions on gasoline imports would be disruptive and would result in creating dislocations in Iran’s economy. However, their impact would be offset to some extent by the likely elimination of the smuggling of gasoline to neighboring countries. Such targeted sanctions will have their own unintended consequences of probably encouraging the smuggling of gasoline from such offshore sources as Dubai from where many products already enter Iran.

James Phillips

The U.S. should mobilize an international coalition to raise the diplomatic, economic, domestic political, and potential military costs to Tehran of continuing to flout its obligations under its nuclear safeguards agreements. This “coalition of the willing” should seek to isolate the Ahmadinejad regime, weaken it through targeted economic sanctions, explain to the Iranian people why their government’s nuclear policies will impose economic costs and military risks on them, contain Iran’s military power, and encourage democratic change. If Tehran persists in its drive for nuclear weapons despite these escalating pressures, then the United States should consider military options to set back the Iranian nuclear weapons program.
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Iran also has been increasingly aggressive in stirring up trouble inside Iraq. In October, the British government charged that the Iranians had supplied sophisticated bombs with shaped charges capable of penetrating armor to clients in Iraq who used them in a series of attacks on British forces in southern Iraq. Iran also has given discreet support to insurgents such as Moqtada al-Sadr, who twice has led Shiite uprisings against coalition forces and the Iraqi government.

Iranian hardliners undoubtedly fear that a stable democratic Iraq would present a dangerous alternative model of government that could undermine their own authority. They know that Iraq’s pre-eminent Shiite religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, whose religious authority is greater than that of any member of Iran’s ruling clerical regime, rejects Khomeini’s radical ideology and advocates traditional Shiite religious doctrines. Although Iran continues to enjoy considerable influence with many Iraqi Shiites, particularly with Iraq’s Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the Dawa Party, the moderate influence of Sistani dilutes their own revolutionary influence. Therefore, Tehran plays a double game in Iraq, using the young firebrand al-Sadr to undermine Sistani and keep pressure on the U.S. military to withdraw, while still maintaining good relations with Shiite political parties who revere Sistani and need continued American support.