Strategy

In February, the Strategic Studies Institute put out a monograph by Dr. Harry Yarger entitled Strategic Theory for the 21st Century.

According to the synopsis,

This "little book" talks about big strategy, strategy at the highest levels of the nation-state. It is applicable to grand strategy, national security strategy, national military strategy, and regional or theater strategy. The monograph does not propose a strategy for the United States; rather, it provides a framework for considering strategy at any of the levels mentioned above. It is an examination of theory, exploring those aspects of strategy that appear to have universal application.

In laying out this framework, the paper makes a distinction between strategy and planning. Strategy is not planning, and planning is not strategy. (emphasis is mine)

Strategy provides a coherent blueprint to bridge the gap between the realities of today and a desired future. It is the disciplined calculation of overarching objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable future outcomes than might otherwise exist if left to chance or the hands of others. It is the consideration of the relation of how to apply resources to achieve desired results in a specific strategic environment over time. In the context of the state, strategy is the employment of specific instruments of power (political/diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own -possibly conflicting— objectives. In other words, it is the application of the power inherent in the natural and societal resources of the state toward policy ends in an emerging, dynamic, and competitive strategic environment. Both strategy and planning are subordinate to the nature of the environment. Strategy has distinct attributes and differs from planning in its scope, assumptions, and premises, but it provides the structure and parameters for more detailed long-range and short-term planning. Both strategy and planning use ends, ways, and means, and are bounded by the criteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Strategy has its own inherent logic that can be understood and applied.

The paper then lays out 15 assumptions and premises of Strategy.

* Strategy is proactive and anticipatory but not predictive.
* Strategy is subordinate to policy.
* Strategy is subordinate to the nature of the environment.
* Strategy maintains a holistic perspective.
* Strategy creates a security dilemma for the strategist and other actors.
* Strategy is founded in what is to be accomplished and why it is to be accomplished.
* Strategy is an inherently human enterprise.
* Friction is an inherent part of strategy.
* Strategy focuses on root purposes and causes.
* Strategy is hierarchical.
* Strategy exists in a symbiotic relationship with time.
* Strategy is cumulative.
* Efficiency is subordinate to effectiveness in strategy.
* Strategy provides a proper relationship or balance among the objectives sought.
* Risk is inherent to all strategy.

Yarger writes that objectives are the ultimate goal in formulating strategy.

Objectives are the true focus of strategy formulation and, if not properly selected and articulated, a proposed strategy is fundamentally flawed and cannot be effective. If the wrong objectives are identified, the concepts and resources serve no strategic purpose.
....
In this regard, objectives are concerned with doing the right things. Concepts are concerned with doing things right. Resources are concerned with costs. Objectives determine effectiveness; concepts and resources are measures of efficiency. A lack of efficiency increases the cost of success, but a lack of effectiveness precludes success.

In this light, we can look at the National Security Strategy (available here in PDF) for the United States. The stated objectives are:

* Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity
* Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends
* Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts
* Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction
* Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade
* Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy
* Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power
* Transform America’s National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century

The aim of a National Security Strategy is to ensure the nation's security. So, we must ask, Are these the right goals? Will these goals be effective in providing for our national security?

Note how these objectives might play a role in national security.

By strengthening alliances, we become strong in numbers and resources.

Diffusing regional conflicts makes for fewer unstable governments, and fewer places where terrorists can take advantage of lawlessness and flourish.

Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons speaks for itself. This one especially, then, deserves closer scrutiny in light of the current crisis with Iran. If we truly believe that a nuclear-armed Iran threatens our security, what can we do to prevent Iran from completing its nuclear weapons program?

Encouraging global economic growth creates a rising tide that lifts all boats. Imagine how much less of a problem immigration from Mexico would be if Mexico's economy was strong and provided good-paying jobs in Mexico.

Transforming our armed forces makes them better suited to face today's threats, or so goes the thinking.

Remember the statement above that strategy is not planning. Merely formulating these goals does not cause them to happen.

However, a good deal of thinking has gone into them, and critics of the Bush Administration do not serve the country well by merely criticizing without providing reasons why these goals do not best serve our national security.

If there are more effective ways to do things, let's hear them. Yet, the Democrats are silent.

Yarger spends some time talking about uncertainty and ambiguity, and how the unknown plays a role in formulating strategy.

To hear the Democrats tell it, uncertainty is a sign of a failure in strategy. Such is hardly the case. However, a sound strategy will try to account for the unknown.

We do not know with certainty the state of Iran's nuclear program. We do not know with certainty how Iran will use its nuclear weapons once it has them.

This uncertainty is part of what led the Bush Administration to invade Iraq. We did not know the state of Hussein's WMD programs, so preemption, justified by Iraq's continued defiance of the UN, was deemed to be in our strategic interest.

This, too, is something critics should answer with respect to Iran. Granted, we don't know all we wish we did about Iran. But, how do we manage the risk inherent in these uncertainties? The Left's answer seems to be to give up and just let Iran have its nuclear weapons.

That is not a strategy, however, and a nation without a strategy will be left flatfooted in the choking dust by a nation that does have one.

Iran clearly has a strategy. Do we, and what are we prepared to do to implement it?