The capture of Abu Ayman

Today MNF-Iraq released news of an important capture. Abu Ayman, a high-level terrorist with strong ties to terror leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, was captured March 7 in southern Baghdad.

Iraqi terrorist leader Muhammed Hila Hammad Ubaydi, aka Abu Ayman, was captured and arrested by Iraqi Forces in the Al Mahmudiyah neighborhood in southern Baghdad March 7. Investigators held notice of this capture until now due to DNA testing, which has confirmed this is Abu Ayman. Ayman's capture was the result of a determined manhunt conducted by Iraqi intelligence professionals and several intelligence agencies within the Coalition.

Until his capture, Abu Ayman, the former aide to the Chief of Staff of Intelligence during the Saddam Hussein regime, was the leader of the Secret Islamic Army in the Northern Babil Province . Abu Ayman has strong ties to terror leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, still considered the head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq .

Abu Ayman is the prime suspect in the kidnapping of Italian journalist Guiliana Sgrena and for assassination attempts on Iraqi Government and Iraqi Security Forces officials.

Abu Ayman is also the prime suspect in the kidnapping and killing of several hostages in Iraq and for committing some of the most lethal IED attacks on Coalition and Iraqi Forces and on Iraqi citizens since the fall of the regime.

As has so often been in the case in Iraq, this success was built on previous successes. The capture of Abu Ayman's lieutenant played a role.

Abu Ayman's lieutenant Abu Qatada, a Syrian born terrorist who was wanted for multiple IED attacks, the assassinations of two Iraqi government council members, and the murders of several truck drivers in order to use their trucks in vehicle borne IED attacks, was captured by Iraqi and Coalition Forces on Dec. 27 during a raid on his house where Abu Qatada was found hiding in a nearby canal. In the months following his capture Abu Qatada has provided valuable information on the Abu Ayman terror network.

An arrest warrant for Abu Ayman was first issued by the Iraqi Central Investigating Court back on October 17, and was made public on November 15.

Security Watchtower highlights what has been standard practice for Coalition Forces. News of significant captures like this is not made public until information gathered from the terrorists can be exploited.

It's interesting to note that the U.S. military didn't announce the capture of Ayman's top aide, Ramsi Ahmed Ismael Muhammed (aka Abu Qatada), until March 9th, two days after Ayman himself was captured. Qatada had been in custody for about 10 weeks at the time, leaving me to question whether a larger fish could've been captured in the last few days, enabling information on Abu Ayman's capture to be publicly confirmed.

Putting Together the Pieces

* 6 April - The capture of Abu Ayman is announced
* 9 March - The capture of Abu Qatada is announced
* 9 March - Large U.S./Iraqi air assault Sadr-Yusufiyah area
* 7 March - Abu Ayman is captured
* 27 February - Raid north of Fallujah nets 61 terror suspects including "key al Qaeda members"
* 6 February - Iraqi police announce capture of Abu Dahr
* 6 February - Iraqi intelligence says Zarqawi moved to Iran
* 23 January - Iraqi intelligence points to Zarqawi in Diyala
* 29 December - Abu Qatada is captured

Was the intelligence in January that pointed towards Zarqawi's presence in Diyala Province generated from interrogations of Abu Qatada? Was the March 9th raid in the Sadr-Yusufiyah area based on intelligence gathered from Abu Ayman? Only the military knows the answers to those questions, but it is worth going back and reexamining the time period during which some of these captures took place in once that information has been released.

I'd like to pick up what C.S. Scott points out here. I've done a number of posts on intelligence successes in Iraq. In Feburary, I suggested perhaps a string of these successes played a role in the attack in Damadola, Pakistan on January 13 aimed at Zawahiri. (He was not present, but the attack did kill several high-level terrorists.)

For more on that, see this post and this post.

The chain of successes I refer to started September 24 when Abu Khalil, assistant to Abu Azzam, a senior leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, was captured.

Abu Azzam was killed the next day, with indications being Abu Khalil provided information that led to Abu Azzam. Here's how Abu Khalil was described:

Abu Khalil, a close associate of Abu Azzam, served as an executive assistant for the terrorist emir. He also acted as a banker for Azzam and stored the terrorist organizations funds so they would not be confiscated should Abu Azzam be killed or captured.

Note that Abu Khalil controlled the purse strings. As I pointed out back then, it so important to follow the money, and Abu Khalil would've had great knowledge of terrorist operations, as money makes the terrorist world go around.

In this post, then, I speculated that Abu Khalil led to another significant success, the capture of another top-level financier, Yasir Sabhawi Ibrahim, son of Saddam's half brother Sabhawi Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti.

This capture occurred October 19, only two days after the arrest warrant for Abu Ayman was issued. The notice of the arrest warrant said this:

Abu Ayman, a Saddamist, was a former aide to the Chief of Staff of Intelligence in the Baathist Regime and has been financing and leading insurgency operations since Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003.

Could the operation that led to Ibrahim returning from Syria to be arrested also have played a role in an arrest warrant being issued for Abu Ayman? As C.S. says, only the military and intelligence agencies know for sure. But, and I cannot stress enough, capturing the senior money guys is so vital, because they know where the money goes, and to whom it is distributed. Ibrahim and Abu Ayman could have had ties.