Islamic recruiting in Europe

A report by Michael Taarnby entitled Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives looked at a process that isn't understand in exquisite detail, the means by which terrorists are recruited into terror networks in Europe. The report was funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice, and was published Januray 14 2005. (It can be viewed here in PDF.)

If you judge by number of arrests, recruiting in Europe is on the rise. In one sense that is puzzling, as the conditions that allowed the 9/11 terrorists to live and planin Hamburg have ceased to exist in the wake of 9/11. Taarnby writes:

A safe haven, a training infrastructure, organisational support, and the integrity needed to prepare a complex terrorist attack have all been dismantled over the past three years.

This development could lead to the assumption that Islamist terrorism has been set back irrevocably. While it is true that the terrorists have been put under considerable pressure, this perspective emphasises the organisational structure of a more or less defunct terrorist organisation and does not take the wider social context into consideration. To simplify the argument, the war on terrorism has notably been successful because Al Qaeda has suffered irretrievable losses. Yet, Islamist terrorism has simultaneously managed to metamorphose into a new threat.

Recruitment certainly existed in Europe before 9/11. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Bosnia in the 1990s required foot soldiers. But Taarnby lists five changes that have transpired since then to transform the nature of recruiting in Europe today.

* The concept of Jihad has devolved into something associated with extreme violence, rather than something to help fellow Muslims

* With increase scruting, recruiting in a Mosque environment has become more difficult.

* The loss of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan forced the terrorists to adapt, and find new ways of training and meeting people.

* Al Qaeda has been significantly weakened since 9/11, and newer ranks of terrorists do not have the ties and experience forged in the earlier successes. Newer networks are more diffuse and dynamic.

* The war in Iraq has been a boon for recruiting in Europe. There has been an increasing number of arrests of terrorists involved in networks sending finances and recruits to Iraq.

One of Taarnby's most interesting points is that the recruitment in Europe is not the result of a focused, top-down approach, but rather results from individual cells and networks developing their own contacts.

The terrorism network analysis undertaken by Marc Sageman has dispelled some prevalent myths about the nature of recruitment to Jihad. His study has revealed the absence of any top-down recruitment: joining the Jihad centres on spontaneously formed groups. Sageman very explicitly states that Al Qaeda never invested much effort into a comprehensive recruitment drive but instead relied on Allah to guide the curious and the dedicated into their fold for further training and indoctrination.

Contrary to popular belief, there is no evidence of a top-down recruitment programme in the global Jihad (Sageman 2004). Somewhat naively, the senior leadership of Al Qaeda expected their vision to be so self-evident that recruits would eventually turn up on the doorstep of the Afghan camps, with a little guidance from their European mentors. This optimism obviously has its roots in an ideology that is only self-evident to the committed insider but it was never rewarded on the anticipated scale. Al Qaeda experienced internal disagreement throughout the 1990s, and the wave of future Mujaheddin never materialised. What did materialise was a small core of very dedicated individuals, so instead of a structured effort it more closely resembled a process in which only the most radical elements joined a terrorist cell. From a conventional organisational perspective the half-hearted recruitment efforts of the past decade cannot be considered a success, yet those who actually joined were fully committed to the cause. This type of non-structured recruitment is very much in place today, and the phenomenon deserves closer scrutiny because it is a critical element in the further development of the Global Jihad.

An interesting study would be to look at whether or not this has changed much in the last year. The rise in recruiting may suggest some more focused efforts. However, as Taarnby writes:

The Global Jihad does not resemble a traditional organisation and there is no point in trying to portray the structure in any kind of organisational diagram. The global Jihad works on quite a different principle, much like that of a social movement defined by a shared ideology and personal interaction. Unlike any other international organisation, the Global Jihad appears to be structured around a number of specific individuals with numerous personal contacts, who through these contacts have the ability to make things happen. These individuals function much like a gatekeeper, since they know the congregations at the radical Mosques, the former Mujaheddin, and active terrorists. While not necessarily conducting terrorist operations themselves, they are able to open the gate to the exclusive community of militant Islamism.

Taarnby goes on at some length on how these gatekeepers develop their recruits. It is usually done in the context of close relationships, often developed through a mosque. The people in these relationships isolate themselves from society, and start to take on a us vs. them mentality.

This pattern of unstructured growth has immense implications. The strength of weak ties makes counterterrorism efforts much more complicated because it is impossible to disrupt an organisational structure that does not exist. Joining as a group appears to be a widespread occurrence in European Islamist circles – the Roubaix gang, the Kelkal group, the Hamburg cell and the members of the 2001 failed embassy plot in Paris are just a few examples of this trend.

Only in this context is the number of militant Islamists residing in Europe of interest. Recruitment to the Jihad is contingent on a pool of candidates of a sufficient size in order to reconstitute itself, to recover from set-backs, and to forge new links.

Taarnby also looks at the type of person being recruited.

As Robert S. Leiken emphasises in a comparative study, the alienated Muslim communities in Europe would appear to be a much more fertile ground for recruitment for radical groups than Muslim communities in the US (Leiken 2004). Through his case studies, Leiken noticed the difference in the level of integration and assimilation between US and French Islamist sleeper cells. Leiken’s analysis resulted in a distinction between two types of candidates of Muslim terrorists, the outsiders and the insiders. The outsiders are the aliens, foreign dissidents, students or asylum seekers, some of whom have sought refuge from anti-Islamic crackdowns in the Middle East or North Africa. The insiders are citizens from the downwardly mobile second-generation immigrants from Muslim countries (Leiken 2004). I am inclined to argue that Leiken’s typology could be augmented by a third type, that of the European convert.

I'll just share Taarnby's thoughts on why second generation Muslims are possible recruits, given that countries like Norway have expressed concern about the threat from their indigenous second generation Muslims.

The reason why second-generation immigrants would be susceptible to recruitment is complex. Arrested terrorists have often been described as seemingly well-integrated, in itself a contradiction in terms. The terrorists were apparently only superficially integrated, and their rejection of society points to a more complex motivation, as witnessed by their deep resentment.

Studies of the French recruits have been helpful in understanding their turn-around. According to Gilles Kepel, they appear to follow a typical trajectory. These young Muslims were all born in Europe and basically tumble into the Islamist circles. The first stage is brainwashing at the hands of a Salafist imam. Later they meet an actual recruiter, who offers to quench their thirst for absolutes through a militant activism. This progression is neither systematic nor inevitable, and often there is a struggle between Salafist imams and the militant Islamists (Kepel 2004). The keyword in Kepel's analysis is tumble, because it is not possible to brainwash someone who is not susceptible. A confused mindset is the mandatory first step. Disillusioned with the society that has excluded them and tired of the empty promises of the official France, second-generation immigrants frequent the Mosque to meet likeminded people. Islam becomes a way to restore their dignity. In the words of Sageman, 'People who are satisfied with life are unlikely to join a religious revivalist terrorist movement'.

If Taarnby is accurate, he has captured why combating the terrorist networks in Europe is difficult. Rather than existing as a dragon with one head, these diffuse networks are more like a Hydra. There is no one head that can be cut off to kill the beast.

Europe is well aware of the threat, and great effort has went into disrupting recruiting efforts.

Last December the European Union adopted an anti-terror strategy that had four areas of focus. One was "prevent new recruits to terrorism."

However, in a sign Europe may still not be prepared to do what it takes to stamp out the terrorist threat in their midst, Swedish justice minister Tomas Bodstrom expressed concern that some might think the strategy was aimed at Muslims.

Swedish justice minister Tomas Bodstrom sought to calm concerns that some parts of the action plan pointed fingers at Muslims as a group, as possible terrorists.

Mr Bodstrom said that as long as the responsible authorities kept repeating that the measures target criminals, and nobody else, it would be obvious that the EU does not wish to accuse any particular religious group.